The study of Africa's new developments and satellite cities has been mostly led under the fundamentally aesthetic typology of 'urban fantasies'. This provides important elements for a critique of how speculative idioms have been tainting contemporary forms of urban development across the continent, but it does not allow us to apprehend them as modes of city making with particular histories, practices and toolkits. This article leans on the Angolan example to contend with that typology. Drawing on an in-depth study of urban development in contemporary Luanda and its relationship with the Angolan oil complex, it does so in three moments. First, it presents a brief overview of what, in the recent years, has become one of the leading ways of critically assessing urban worlding projects in the African context. Second, it uses an introductory viewpoint into Luanda's 'new centralities' project to contribute towards an improved and more nuanced understanding of what underpins and constitutes the envisioned futures of African cities. And third, it reconsiders and fine-tunes some of the main premises on which the study of Africa's emerging forms of urban development has been carried out thus far.
with a bus stop to his left and two long lines of multi-storey buildings vanishing behind his back, he presents Kilamba to the world.
'Kilamba is based on a campaign promise,' McKenzie now conveys in less vivid fashion. The camera zooms in on him. 'For the 2008 election Angola's president pledged to the people a million homes for ordinary citizens.' Turning his torso slightly to the side and looking away from the camera, he gesticulates more emphatically. 'And Kilamba is an attempt to do that.' There is a sense of astonishment in both his body language and his words. 'They've built cities like this across the country,' he continues, before moving his arms in one sprouting-like motion, 'coming literally out of the bush'. There was, however, one huge problem with this new city. Looking purposely behind his back, as if inspecting his entire surroundings, McKenzie explains it to his viewers. 'From where I am standing,' he says, 'Kilamba feels almost deserted.' The piece continues and the declamatory voice-over returns with some more images of the city: 'Four-lane highways without cars. Schools without people.' Two idle Asian workers come up on the screen. 'In under five years a Chinese company built Kilamba using Angola's credit lines with China.' A couple more views of empty streets, a slightly graver tone and McKenzie brings it home in just under 45 seconds. 'But parts of Kilamba feel like a ghost town. ' The CNN ran slightly different versions of this story between the end of October and early November 2012 (see, for example, McKenzie 2012, October 29), but they were far from breaking news to the world. In fact, the City of Kilamba-in Portuguese, Cidade do Kilamba-had been the object of a media frenzy of planetary proportions almost four months before that. It all happened after a BBC News piece originated a torrent of second-hand reports that made the rounds of social media in no time. In it, Louise Redvers (2012, July 3) described how 'the jewel in Angola's post-war reconstruction crown' and 'the star of glossy government promotional videos which show smiling families enjoying a new style of living away from the dust and confusion of central Luanda' stood practically empty almost one year after the official opening. Making (and filming) her way to the housing development, 'perched in an isolated spot some 30 km outside Luanda' in early July 2012, when a mere 220 of the 2,800 apartments that were initially made available had been sold, she too was flabbergasted with what she saw. 'The place is eerily quiet, voices bouncing off all the fresh concrete and wide-open tarred roads. There are hardly any cars and even fewer people, just dozens of repetitive rows of multi-coloured apartment buildings, their shutters sealed and their balconies empty.' Faced with a grandiose urban scenery and no people other than Chinese workers, Redvers is led to ponder if 'the ghost towns of China, Ireland and Spain may be a phenomenon that is on its way to Africa. ' This article makes the case for unveiling the circuitries within such ghostly appearances on Luanda's urban landscape. More than that, it leans on the Angolan example to contend with how the study of Africa's new developments and satellite cities has been mostly led under the fundamentally aesthetic typology of 'urban fantasies'. The argument here is that while this provides important elements for a critique of how speculative idioms have been tainting contemporary forms of urban development across the continent, it does not allow us to apprehend them as modes of city making with particular histories, practices and toolkits. Drawing on an in-depth study of urban development in contemporary Luanda and its relationship with the Angolan oil complex, 1 what follows below is organised in two core sections and a conclusion.
The first part of the article, titled 'African Urban Fantasies: Lineaments of an Aesthetic Typology', presents a brief overview of what, in the recent years, has become one of the leading ways of critically assessing urban worlding projects in the African context. This is not intended as a comprehensive review of the literature on African urbanism, nor is it aimed at examining the work of any specific scholar. The objective here is rather to draw out the contours and limitations of an approach that is often organised around metaphors of spectrality and delusion. It is in contrast with these that the following section is organised. In 'The Modern Way of Thinking Cities'-a title borrowed from the Angolan president's speech during the opening ceremony for Cidade do Kilamba-the aim is to contribute towards an improved and more nuanced understanding of what underpins and constitutes the envisioned futures of African cities in the twenty-first century. Presenting an introductory viewpoint into Luanda's 'new centralities' project, it peruses underneath its fantasies to specify some crucial calculative elements of its constitutive circuitries. Finally, in 'The Real Circuitries of African Urban Fantasies', two of the main premises with which the study of Africa's emerging forms of urban development has been carried out thus far are reconsidered and fine-tuned. The article concludes here by offering a brief window into the role that calculative regimes might have in contemporary urbanism in Africa and elsewhere.
African Urban Fantasies: Lineaments of an Aesthetic Typology
With such rampant and widespread notoriety, that which was only the largest of Luanda's so-called 'new centralities' could not escape the scrutiny of urbanists and analysts with an interest in African cities. For many of those concerned with the forms of urban development that have been emerging throughout the continent, Kilamba's 750 high-rises were the embodiment of why post-war Angola had become-to use the words of Allan Cain (2014, p. 563 ), a Luanda-based urban planner and longstanding director of Development Workshop Angola-'a pioneer of the new urbanism in Africa'. For instance, in the latest instalment of UN Habitat's The State of African Cities (2014, p. 7), Kilamba is used as one of the primary examples given to substantiate some of the bleakest conjectures made about the 'new towns and satellite cities now being established to relieve pressures on the largest African urban concentrations'. In fact, the desolation portrayed by Redvers and McKenzie was often used as a dire warning for the rest of the continent. As Nairobi-based urban practitioner and UN Habitat consultant Jane Lumumba (2013, February 5) put it while concluding a blog post about 'why Africa should be wary of its new cities', Cidade do Kilamba 'was a fantasy and has remained so since its inception-an ominous sign for the many other new cities popping up around the continent'.
Another illustration of how Kilamba has been taken to represent a continent-wide occurrence comes from the CNN again. In a 2013 story written for Future Cities, a reporting initiative offering 'an inside look at the rapid evolution of urban spaces', Teo Kermeliotis (2013, May 30) examines the touted intentions of a number of international property developers who, in the preceding few years, had announced 'plans for new satellite cities and vast modern compounds across Africa'. Almost always 'branded as smart and futuristic', these ambitious planning and development schemes are, as he puts it, 'usually planned to be built from scratch on the edges of the continent's existing metropolises'. Cidade do Kilamba was not among the initiatives analysed, but Kermeliotis borrowed from critics such as Cain and Lumumba (as well as McKenzie's reports from Luanda) to suggest that the Angolan 'ghost city' might be an indicator of how those looming plans could be 'out of touch' with the reality of African cities. Among the experts whom he draws from to arrive at this conclusion are, of course, many academics.
For the fact is that this recent surge in master plans and grand visions for African cities has raised considerable interest among urban scholars and students of African urbanism. If nothing else, it seems, this is due to the ostensibly stark contrast between their underlying aspirations and the disregard for urban planning that had swept the continent since the dawn of structural adjustment. Filip De Boeck (2011, p. 272) , for example, has written about 'the new Kinshasa' that the Congolese government authorities 'have recently committed themselves to after decades of disinterest and laissez-faire'. One other country-specific contribution to the study of these new dynamics comes from Garth Myers (2015, p. 328) , who has looked into Kenya's 'efforts to reimagine Nairobi as a "world-class city region" by 2030'. And then there are those who have stretched over national boundaries and focussed their analyses on the resurgence of blueprints and grand urban schemes across the entire continent. Richard Grant (2015) , for instance, has analysed the way in which the 'planning void' (p. 297) African cities had grown in for a number of decades has been recently filled by a 'groundswell of interest' (p. 294) in these new urban projects, while David Simon (2015, p. 221) has actually used Cidade do Kilamba as a paradigmatic illustration of 'a widespread movement to insert generally unsustainable "international" or "world class" elite enclaves into urban landscapes in Africa and elsewhere'.
Others could be cited here, but it is Vanessa Watson who has brought this issue up more emphatically thus far. In her main piece on this recent promise to modernise African cities, an article that includes brief glimpses at a few initiatives in Luanda, the professor of city planning at the University of Cape Town reviews schemes to renew, extend or replace cities in various countries across the continent and describes them as 'African urban fantasies' (Watson, 2014a) . Borrowing from Michael Goldman's work in Bangalore (Goldman, 2011) , while considering both factors endogenous to the sub-Saharan African context and the particularities of the international scramble for new urban development and real estate markets in a continent experiencing a period of resource-based economic growth, she suggests that these visions of future cities are indicative of burgeoning 'processes of speculative urbanism' (Watson, 2014a, p. 216) .
In doing so, Watson leads the academic effort to interpret and codify the efforts directed at the rekindling of urban planning in contemporary Africa. She does not necessarily provide a systematic classification of plans that are either 'finding their way through to implementation' or 'still at the ideas stage' (Watson, 2014a, p. 226) , but she does rehearse a categorisation that resonates with other analyses in and beyond the academic subfield of African urbanism. And one of the central tenets in what can be seen as an exploratory typology of planning aspirations pertains to their referential orders and means of representation. This, I would argue, is a key theoretical lens in the aforementioned 2014 article as well as in associated works on the theme. As in the Indian case, Watson has more recently asserted in a commentary to Ayona Datta's study of Dholera Smart City (Datta, 2015) , in contemporary Africa 'the form and aesthetics of the built environment are what really count' (Watson, 2015, p. 37) .
Like Filip De Boeck (2011, p. 279) , who describes much of Congo's urban politics as an 'ocular ground of billboards and advertisements', Vanessa Watson then identifies the domain of the image as a core terrain of city making across the continent. For them, and plenty of other analysts of African cities, the rationales of 'African urban fantasies' are mostly constituted through imagery filled with 'glass-box towers, manicured lawns and water features' (Watson, 2014a, p. 215) as well as graphics showing 'strong influences of high modernist architecture and visual references to "iconic" eastern cities ' (2014, p. 222) . In fact, even if Watson (2014a, p. 217) found the plans she reviewed 'on the websites of the global companies that have developed them', while De Boeck (2011, p. 274 ) saw those billboards and advertisements covering 'almost every street and boulevard in Kinshasa', their analyses are here both very similar to one another and quite illustrative of the Angolan case.
Indeed, in the years after the end of the civil war in 2002, the future of Luanda was often vividly and symbolically depicted as facing the East. In few places is this more evident than in the Winter 2008 issue of Universo, a magazine dedicated to showcasing both Angola and the Angolan national oil company to the world. On the cover, a computerised drawing of Sigma's three towers project in downtown Luanda glows under the title 'Future city: Why Luanda is the new Dubai'. Inside, the cover story, which includes a special report by Louise Redvers (before she became BBC's correspondent in Angola) and an interview with the then presidential advisor on city planning, spans in between the spaces left open by multiple other 3D renderings. 'After years of neglect, ' Redvers writes (2008, Winter, p. 8) , 'Angola's war-torn capital is turning into a West African Dubai'. Luanda had become a 'city of dreams ' (2008, Winter) . Or, as the magazine's editor puts it, a 'Phoenix rising', a 'building site' where 'a new city is emerging' and the 'grandeur' of when 'Luanda used to be one the most beautiful cities in Africa' (i.e., the time when the Portuguese called it 'the Paris of Africa') was slowly returning (Bellos, 2008, Winter, p. 4) .
Like in the Luanda anticipated in that 2008 issue of Sonangol's Universo, the content and range of expectations gauged by Watson and De Boeck are fundamentally defined by both their aesthetic properties and their eastern promises. Not only do the plans assessed by the first 'consist of graphically represented and three-dimensional visions of future cities' (Watson, 2014a, p. 217) , just as the billboards picked apart by the second 'show representations of soon-to-be-constructed conference centres, five star hotels, and skyscrapers' (De Boeck, 2011, p. 274) , their urban projections are also said to be 'clearly influenced by cities such as Dubai, Shanghai or Singapore' (Watson, 2014a, p. 217) . In other wordsthose used by De Boeck (2015, p. S153) to talk about the 'teleological futurities' of urban reforms in Kinshasa-Watson's urban fantasies portray not just a continent 'again looking into the mirror of modernity to fashion itself' but a mirror which instead of reflecting earlier versions of colonial modernity now 'longs to capture the aura of Dubai and other hot spots of the new urban Global South' (De Boeck, 2011, p. 274) .
This focus on aesthetics in the interpretation of African planning endeavours is also clearly noticeable in dimensions beyond their referential orders and means of representation. In fact, the ocular and symbolic qualities of these emerging new plans gain further prominence when we consider the ways in which Watson and most other analysts describe characteristics such as their scale of intervention or their discursive content. This is because the unveiled images of 'African urban fantasies' are never modest or small scale; they are always portrayed as 'grandiose planning schemes' (Myers, 2015, p. 343) . Sometimes they entail renewing sweeping expanses of existing cities; at others, they encompass large projects in the urban fringe, but more often they involve a fundamental restructuring of metropolitan areas through the creation of new satellite cities (see, for example, Grant, 2015, pp. 299-303; Watson, 2014a, pp. 217-222) . Furthermore, in what concerns their main underlying ideas, academic analyses emphasise that most 'African urban fantasies' tend to articulate discourses of sustainability and technological change. More often than not, they point out, the proposed new cities are set out to be smart, eco or green. But these labels, they immediately insinuate, amount to little more than a 'legitimation strategy' and a 'marketing ploy' for projects that are fundamentally driven by their yield (see Watson, 2014a, pp. 225-226) . As Grant (2015, p. 302) suggests, they 'may be no more than a thin green veneer to property developers' and place promoters' profit motivations and short-term horizons'.
This takes us to the indictments of 'African urban fantasies'. In construing it as an aesthetic typology, Watson and most other analysts of this recent surge in grand visions for African cities make a number of criticisms. Three deserve our attention. First, they all maintain, in one way or another, that there is an irreconcilable gap between the 'spectral, and often spectacular' images of Africa's 'reinsertion into the global oecumene' (De Boeck, 2011, p. 274 ) and the realities of poverty on the ground. For Watson (2015, p. 37) , more than the attempts to build on the potential and range of development aspirations now announced for cities like Accra, Dar es Salaam or Lagos, these new plans for African cities hold 'very remote' possibilities of being implemented.
A second indicting assessment made by analysts of 'African urban fantasies' has to do with how they persistently 'avoid dealing with the messy spatial realities of existing cities' (Grant, 2015, p. 299) . Projecting hyper-modern urban standards and a life away from the purported disorder of existing urban settlements, 'the bulk of the new urban fantasy plans takes the form of new satellite cities adjacent to existing larger cities' (Watson, 2014a, p. 217) . By the same token, Watson suggests, they seem to be institutionally set up to 'simply parallel or override' (ibid.) the existing legal and governance structures, including any formal city plans that may already exist, or the complications of democratic decisionmaking processes. The anticipated result of this expedited facilitation of property investment interests is a 'splintering urbanism', at a scale yet unseen (Watson, 2015, p. 39) , a sweeping landscape of autonomous cities, immense elite enclaves and profoundly differentiated access to infrastructure.
Driven by and for the local elites, Watson (2014a, p. 229 ) then argues, 'African urban fantasies' will cause state spending to be 'skewed in [their direction] and away from meeting the basic services and housing needs of the much larger poor urban populations'. Or they will simply 'sweep the poor away' (Watson, 2014b) . This constitutes the third big charge made by analysts of African urbanism. If Goldman (2011, p. 577 ) sees many Bangaloreans 'being actively dispossessed as part of the effort to build up a world city based on a speculative imaginary', Watson foresees devastating consequences for African cities and the lives of the urban poor who 'will [probably] find themselves not only dispossessed of land but also of political rights ' (2014a, p. 230) . In other words, 'African urban fantasies' are for Watson (ibid.) 'dreams' of an urban future that are bound to turn into 'nightmares' for contemporary urban dwellers. They represent for Simon (2015, p. 221) a 'partial elite resurgence' of urban planning that is coupled with its 'popular eclipse'. Or, to put it in De Boeck's terms, they are articulations of a 'spectral urban politics' (2011), a form of city making that is predicated on a 'tendency to physically and conceptually obliterate the reality of local lives' (2015, p. S153).
Circuitries of the Ghost City: Looking Beyond the Spectral
These are, of course, very important observations. They are empirically relevant, they call attention to the disconnectedness of contemporary urban planning, and they raise crucial moral and political questions about the ways in which the future of African cities has been imagined in the twenty-first century. What their proponents seem less interested in doing, however, is to account for how these 'fantasy city ideas' (Watson, 2015, p. 36) are actually becoming realities in many of those African cities. While they announce that such top-down visions 'are beginning to make an appearance on the African continent' (Watson, 2014a, p. 216) , they pay little attention to how they are actually coming about. As Emma Wragg and Regina Lim (2015, p. 260) have pointed out in a study of the way ordinary Lusakans respond to the very same fantasies identified by Vanessa Watson, 'a key question to ask is how these visions have come to be?' The problem with disregarding what forms and informs the creation of such urban visions, their study suggests, is that it leaves us unaware of how those fantasy city ideas 'are literally "assembled" through layering of diverse influences'. Claudia Gastrow, who writes about Angola, goes further in her critique. She argues that in this literature 'the actual politics of design, aesthetics, and materiality have been largely overlooked ' (2016, p. 2) . This is 'problematic' for her because it ignores the aesthetic orientations of the African urban residents and their 'grounded engagements' with new city projects, which she then goes on to explore for the case of Luanda. I am in complete agreement with Gastrow here, but I would add something else to her critique of Watson, De Boeck and Myers. My contention with the typology of planning aspirations they inaugurate has more to do with its disregard for what underpins and constitutes the substance of the fantasies it indicts. In addition to Gastrow's critique, I would say that neglecting the no-less 'grounded' features of the arrangements through which these fantasies have emerged, regardless even of whether or not they are actually being built, renders us oblivious to the unavoidably messy politics that go into planning and designing what they contemplate as the future of African cities. This also obscures questions about the specific forms of urban worlding projects being instigated in the African context (Gastrow, 2016, p. 3) for a number of reasons. It prevents us from understanding what exactly constitutes and shapes official attempts to manage, regulate and service urban development in the African context. It does not allow us to apprehend those plans as modes of city making with particular histories, practices and toolkits. It actually precludes us from opening what Edgar Pieterse (2013, p. 13) , in his introduction to Rogue Urbanism, referred to as 'new lines of thought and imagination that may help us forge more persuasive and compelling accounts of the complexity of everyday urbanism in multiple African spaces'. And ultimately, I believe, it leaves the forms of spatial production underneath those 'urban fantasies' impervious to critique.
With this in mind, since Luanda is 'a city where one of the fantasies discussed by Professor Watson has developed beyond a dream to become a reality' (Cain, 2014, p. 561) , the following section provides an introductory viewpoint into how Kilamba actually came to have an indelible 'impact on the urban fabric' (Watson, 2014a, p. 226) of the Angolan capital. But the point is not simply to present the perspective of a city where some of those fantasies turned out to materialise beyond plans and drawings. The objective is to begin to move our understanding of Africa's new developments and satellite cities beyond the generic realm of the oneiric. This is because sometimes, perhaps even on many occasions, these plans and drawings are more than ungrounded delusions, more than mere speculative images. They are developed in specific conditions and are tied to palpable political and economic circuitries. What this means for the Angolan case is that the 'new centralities' did not really emerge 'out of the bush', as David Mackenzie so vividly explained, nor are they mere refractions in 'a Chinese rear view mirror' (Power, 2012) . In fact, I argue here, Cidade do Kilamba is much more than a spectacular and high-modernist 'urban transplant' (Soares de Oliveira, 2015, p. 66), a 'tabula rasa dream' (Buire, 2014, p. 299) or a 'phantasmagoria of the future' (Pitcher & Moorman, 2015) . It is an instance of a mode of city making deeply entwined in those political and economic circuitries-a form of globalised spatial production that, in the Angolan context, flows out of (and back into) what Michael Watts (2012, pp. 441-443) has called 'the oil assemblage'. By looking into Cidade do Kilamba, like Timothy Mitchell (2011, p. 5) would do, as 'the outcome of particular ways of engineering political relations out of flows of energy' (2011, p. 5), this article is then also a call for tracing the links between the financialisation of Angola's deep-water oil deposits, the urban visions of the national government and the modes of expertise evoked in forging the future of Angolan cities.
Again, the aim here is far from providing a comprehensive overview of the 'new centralities' project in Luanda. As it will become clear further down the article, this would involve delving deep into circuitry threads weaving through the undersea of the Angolan coastline, across money transactions in Beijing and Hong Kong, and into the blueprints and models produced for the different 'new centralities'. Nevertheless, I would argue, even a cursory examination of these circuitries allows us to complicate the typology put forward under the banner of 'African urban fantasies'. This is why the following section focusses on two manifestations of these in the case of Kilamba. Putting emphasis on the connection between the calculative practices through which the project began to materialise in late 2004 and the metrics of distribution through which its ghostly eeriness was eventually eradicated in 2013, these will offer only a very brief look into what was a highly convoluted and secretive process of decision-making, but one that will allow us to reassess and adjust some of our current propositions for analysing the new forms of spatial production emerging throughout Africa.
'The Modern Way of Thinking Cities'
Little more than one year prior to CNN's segment on Kilamba-on 11 July 2011-the broadcasting airwaves coming out of the southern periphery of Luanda carried a drastically different message to a significantly dissimilar audience. TPA, the Angolan public television network, aired a whole show exclusively dedicated to sing the praises of the new city. Taking off with a fast-paced African drum beat and a quick sequence of images from the construction phase, including multiple aerial views of the entire project as well as many brief clips of Angolan workers, the show began with a cheerful greeting: 'Welcome all to the information special about the great achievement that is the inauguration of Cidade do Kilamba.' Sporting a suit coat and tie, Alexandre Cose stood alone on a patch of green grass. In his hands, was a tablet that he never looked at; behind him, a wall of yellow and ostensibly new high-rises. When the image suddenly zoomed out, he too opened his arms for the camera. But Cose's stance was, of course, very different from that of CNN's David McKenzie's. 'A megaproject that is today a source of pride for the country and for the rest of the world.' To reach that day, he ensured, 'there was a lot of commitment and hard work'.
The opening celebrations were led by President José Eduardo dos Santos. Welcomed by a large group of people waving MPLA flags and all sorts of party propaganda material, the head of the state was in charge of cutting the ribbon and unveiling the inaugural plaque. But in the speech ceremony, which took place well away from the crowd, it was the CEO of Sonangol who first spoke to the 'members of parliament, local representatives, religious leaders, diplomats and senior officials' (Da Rosa, 2011, June). The national oil company had been officially in charge of managing the construction of Kilamba since September 2010 and its highest-ranking official took it upon himself to break down the numbers and explain what was going on. 'With today's ceremony we are formalising the first delivery' (in Especial inauguração', 2011, July 11). This, he described to all of those present as well as the TPA cameras, amounted to '10 kilometres of roads, 115 buildings with a total of 3,180 apartments and 48 stores'. The rest of phase one was scheduled for the following 15 months. He continued with his tally: 218 buildings, including 6,130 apartments and 78 stores, were programed for December and the last 377 buildings, which were to offer another 10,692 apartments and 120 stores, were anticipated for October 2012. In addition to the 20,002 houses and 246 commercial units, the brochure distributed during the ceremony specified, the 906 hectares of that first stage would also include '24 kindergartens, 9 primary schools and 8 secondary schools' as well as 'space reserved for the construction of 1 hospital, 4 clinics, 12 health centres, 3 financial institutions, post offices, gas stations, police units and stations, fire stations, parking lots, churches, cemetery and other structures'.
And that was not all. In fact, Cidade do Kilamba was far from being the only new centrality under Sonangol's responsibility on that day. In the Luanda region alone, four more projects for an expected total of about 19,000 apartments were well underway (Sonangol, 2013) and the construction of an additional 18,000 houses in three other schemes would begin in the following couple of years (Angola Press, 2014, March 3). Beyond the capital, on that very same day, there were 'new centralities' under development in Lunda Norte and Cabinda, and multiple others would soon follow throughout the rest of the country. Dos Santos, whose opening speech was entirely broadcast by TPA and fully reproduced in the written media (Dos Santos, 2011, July 11), began with precisely that. 'About a dozen centralities or satellite towns of various sizes,' he explained in an effort to both contextualise and magnify that moment, 'were projected by the then Office for National Reconstruction (GRN) to be built in phases in the country's eighteen provinces'. Of all the projects underway, amongst those that were already being built, Cidade do Kilamba was the earliest achievement. Included in 'the overall fabric of the city of Luanda,' he said, it was 'the largest housing project ever built in Angola' and 'the first important step of the executive in order to meet the right of Angolans to access housing with a minimum of dignity and comfort'. But it was more than just that. It was also a representative of the particular form of urban development with which the government was expecting 'to solve the housing deficit' and 'deal with the constant growth' the Angolan capital had been going through. It was, in other words, a mode of city making-an approach that dos Santos found the need to explain:
The development of new centralities is the most commonly adopted way of correcting uncontrolled growth in large cities, where there is no space or infrastructure to support more population in their traditional urban fabric. The city will thus have not only one but several centres, offering all the functional conditions for citizens to live their lives without having to frequently travel very far from their place of residence. The creation of Cidade do Kilamba responds, therefore, to the modern way of thinking cities.
Metrics of Distribution
The President's audience, however, seems to have been much less concerned with the modern character of the new city than it was with the sale price of the apartments. The rumour amongst those present at the ceremony was that it would range between US$100,000 and US$300,000 (Novo Jornal, 2011, July 15). Once the fanfare was over, the interest extended to the general public. In the following weeks, people were said to be 'anxiously awaiting' for more information about prices and payment options (Jornal de Angola, 2011, July 21) , while the authorities claimed to be working hard to find a solution that would simultaneously ensure the affordability of the houses and allow for the investment to be recovered (Angola Press, 2011, July 27).
When the solution had seemingly been found, about one month after the opening ( Jornal de Angola, 2011, August 20) Sonangol put the 3,180 apartments on the market (through SONIP, its real estate arm, and Delta Imobiliária, the company contracted out to manage the selling process) and the demand was massive. But the prices were not quite what people had been anticipating (see Table 1 , second column). A lot were 'disappointed, unhappy and surprised' (Voz da América, 2011, August 24), not just with how much the houses were selling for but with the lack of extended payment plans. Given the hefty upfront prices, with the cheapest apartments selling at US$125,000, the overwhelming majority would have to get a long-term bank loan to finance the purchase. The problem was that the housing mortgage market was practically non-existent and the various governmental attempts to stimulate it did not achieve much. Of the 'more than 70 thousand' people who had applied for purchasing a house until January 2012, only 120 actually bought it (O País, 2012, January 6). In late June, soon before the BBC's visit to Kilamba, the number of purchased apartment had risen up to a mere 210 (Jornal de Angola, 2012, June 27 ), all of which had been paid for in cash.
In order to fix this problem, President dos Santos created an 'ad hoc commission with the specific aim of studying and monitoring the rules for selling the houses in the new centralities' (Despacho Presidencial nº 34/12), and about one year after the opening of Cidade do Kilamba, a direct translation of renda resolúvel would be 'resolvable rent' regime-was put in place for the same number of apartments that had initially been made available (see Decreto Executivo Conjunto nº 253/12; Decreto Presidencial nº 107/12). Under a scheme managed by the then recently created FFH, a state-owned housing funding agency, the renterbuyer was to pay a monthly rent (plus a 16% condominium fee) for 30 years and the property title would only be transferred once the last payment had been completed (see Table 1 , FFH). But this solved only part of the problem because the entire first phase, which was delivered soon after the new regime was created, comprised 20,002 houses (Angola Press, 2012, September 17). A couple of months later, despite the distribution of more than 4,000 houses, almost 10,000 others stood empty and ready to be occupied. On 10 November, during a 'field visit' to Kilamba, President dos Santos expressed great concern with the 'low occupancy rate' and gave instructions for the prices to be reduced (Da Rosa, 2012, November 10) . The CEO of Sonangol concurred. The 'lack of effective physical occupancy,' he would say a week later, was the Sonangol's main preoccupation in Cidade do Kilamba and the 'paucity of household incomes' in Angola left no other option (Ndipa, 2012, November 16) . The question, however, was how much (and through what method) would the prices have to be reduced. 'If Sonangol foregoes the interest on its loans and SONIP waives all of its profit margin, the prices can be immediately brought down 10%,' he said. But this, he also maintained, would not be enough. In order for the demand to go up in a significant fashion, 'the prices had to be reduced by 40 to 50 per cent'. And so it happened: a couple of months later, and seventeen months after the first batch of apartments were made available to the public, the prices came down.
It was on the last days of January 2013 that SONIP announced that all five of Luanda's 'new centralities'-Kilamba, Cacuaco, Capari, Km 44 and Zango-would be put on the market. More than 30,000 unsold houses were to be offered. Beginning 1 February, those interested were to head to Delta's branches in Cidade do Kilamba or to SONIP's own offices in Zango, Cacuaco or Kilamba. In addition to being available for cash payments, the apartments could now be rented as well as bought over 15 or 20 years through the renda resolúvel system. Correspondingly, the price lists now included four different tables for each project, spread across an eight-page ad that ran for several days on Jornal de Angola. While the originally intended prices for Cacuaco, Zango, Capari or Km 44 were never revealed, in Kilamba there were price drops of up to 44 per cent (see Table 2 ). Unsurprisingly, the lines outside Delta and SONIP went on for days.
But despite all the enthusiasm, the new centralities were still out of reach for the vast majority of Luandans. Regardless of any reductions or the universalisation of access, the new prices were still too high for a country where most live on less than US$2 a day and the requirement to be formally employed continued to leave the bulk of the population out of the renda resolúvel system. In fact, as some have argued (see Cain, 2014, pp. 564-567) , the government's initiative to build 'new centralities' steered away state funds from those in most need. For not only were infrastructure investments for these areas being prioritised over the musseques where about two thirds of Luandans lived with poor or no access to infrastructure and basic services, they were also sitting on all sorts of state subsidies. From the acquisition of land, which was initially undertaken by the GRN at almost no cost, to the support provided to those who were able to get access to a house, the new centralities rested on a tremendous subvention given to middle class families. And nowhere was this more evident than in Kilamba, where a very rough estimate puts the subsidies indirectly received by the tenant-buyers at an average total of more than US$70,000 per household.
Calculations of Production
The main goal of this article, however, is not to show that state spending in Angola has subsidised the middle class or that it was skewed towards the supply of particular segments of the market. Nor is it to argue that new city projects are financially unsustainable or prone to deepen urban inequality. These are arguments rehearsed by Vanessa Watson and well corroborated by Allan Cain, whose complementary remarks on Cidade do Kilamba and Angola's development trajectory since the turn of the millennium have been further substantiated by the work of scholars such as Ricardo Soares de Oliveira and Marcus Power. Rather than simply adding to the litany of indictments against the Angolan government's policy choices or the clientelist nature of its actions (see, for example, de Morais, 2011, September 26), the core objective here is to illustrate the circuitries through which Cidade do Kilamba came to exist. These metrics of distribution constitute only one of their many expressions. One other, perhaps more incisive, manifestation can be found at its origins. Differently from what Watson (2014a, p. 216 ) submits in her continent-wide generalisation, the project for building 'new centralities' in Angola was not an after-effect of the 2008 financial crisis. While the ensuing drop in oil prices certainly had repercussions for its progress, the financial debacle was simply not the cause for its initial development. In fact, when taking into consideration the institutional and financing edifice that allowed them to emerge, the plans for Kilamba and the other 'new centralities' actually began to take shape as part of the government's strategy for rebuilding and modernising the country after the end of the civil war in 2002. 4 Moreover, contrary to what analysts of 'African urban fantasies' would have us believe, planning in Luanda, at the turn of the century, was not exactly taking place in a void. With a protracted history of attempts to intervene in urban development, among which the 1994 Luanda Sul Self-Financed Urban Infrastructure Programme was perhaps the most consequential, the realm of official planning in the Angolan capital was rather entangled in multiple layers of law and bureaucratic ruling. What I would then first like to suggest is that Cidade do Kilamba was extricated out of the entrapments of existing planning processes through a set of oil-backed financing arrangements with Chinese institutions.
The key date here is 20 October 2004, the day the Angolan government officially approved both the creation of the GRN, which was briefly commemorated by dos Santos in his Kilamba speech, and the establishment of the so-called framework agreement for the strategic public-private partnership between the Republic of Angola and the People's Republic of China. If the first was set up as a government agency aimed at coordinating, overseeing and managing reconstruction initiatives of purportedly strategic importance throughout the entire country, the second laid out the groundwork for financing those initiatives (see Decreto-Lei nº 6/04; Resolução nº 31/04).
By then the Angolan government had already established a number of public investment loans with foreign creditors, the most significant of which was the China Exim Bank credit line. Set up by a 'framework agreement' signed in November 2003, this facility was structured in such a way that debt repayments were guaranteed by the periodic shipment of crude oil from Angola to China (see Corkin, 2013, pp. 75-91) . Similarly, the 'framework agreement' approved in October 2004 introduced the China International Fund (CIF) to the Angolan institutional landscape-the CIF being not just a 'private entity headquartered in Hong Kong with the specific purpose of creating facilities or credit lines to finance projects within the framework of the GRN' (Ministério das Finanças, 2007, October 17) , but also the central element in an intricate corporate web in which China Sonangol, a 2004-founded joint venture that included the Angolan national oil company, played the role of oil intermediary (see Corkin, 2013, pp. 138-140) .
While much has been said about both CIF and GRN, it is not my intention here to weigh in on those debates. Leaving aside both speculations and palpable signs of wrongdoing, I look at these institutions as having provided tangible infrastructure for adjusting and consolidating a mode of city making that had been in formation in Luanda since the mid-1990s. More specifically, I argue that their oil-infused partnership contributed towards transforming the calculi and practices of urban planning in contemporary Luanda. In the first couple of years of their existence, through the establishment of a protocol for the elaboration of the Plan for the New City of Luanda as well as the signing of an agreement to build 215,500 housing units throughout the country, CIF and GRN provided grounding pillars for the emergence of the 'new centralities' project. Even if none of these contracts seem to have taken off in its entirety or reached anywhere near what it initially proposed to achieve, they introduced new forms of imagining and negotiating the future of the Angolan capital.
In this respect, one of the most significant impacts of the GRN/CIF compact was that it provided an impetus for steering urbanisation processes to become deeply entangled in quantitative deliberations about the volume of development outcomes and the minutiae of contractual obligations. The basic agreement for the development of new housing, for example, spelled out a countrywide planning calculus that fits better in a spreadsheet than it does on a 3D rendering. In the capital, where the new city of Luanda was being planned for an area of 780 square kilometres, the goal was to build 120,000 apartments, of which 72,000 would have three bedrooms and 48,000 would have four (Grupo Técnico das Urbanizações do Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, 2005, July 29). But the numbers did not stop at the contracts. The many months of technical deliberations that followed-those led by the handful of architects, engineers and planners that comprised the GRN's technical group for urban development-were also often reduced to the quantification of specific architectural standards and the establishment of measurable development guidelines. Frequently characterised by objections to the solutions presented by the CIF contractors, those practices of planning were mostly arithmetic.
This became particularly evident in early June 2006 when, after the GRN first officially presented the 'three-year project' to build '200,000 houses throughout the country' (Angola Press, 2006, March 7), the Permanent Commission of the Council of Ministers and the President of the Republic gave orders 'to continue improving the projects' (Angola Press, 2006, June 7) . In response to this, two days later, the GRN's technical group wrote an internal memo in which it summarised the reasons it considered the 'technical conditions' to implement the project to have not been met (Coordenador do Grupo Técnico das Urbanizações, 2006, June 9) . Amongst the various concerns, perhaps the most crucial had to do with density or, in the terminology utilised by the technical group, the area allocated to each housing unit for the purpose of designing the physical layout of the different developments. In fact, earlier documents show, this had been a disputed issue since the initial meetings with CIF. According to the norms that were earlier assembled by the GRN planners, the area was to be 196.5 square metres per unit, which amounted to 42,345.75 square metres being attributed to the programme throughout the country. But the 'Chinese proposal' was, in their spreadsheet calculations, 13,665.162 square metres short of that goal (Grupo Técnico das Urbanizações do Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, n.d.).
In the assertion made to me by a former member of the GRN's Technical Group, this was 'the beginning of the end' for CIF. Still, in what may have been an attempt to provide official certification for the purpose of finding investors, on 12 July the Council of Ministers retroactively ratified all of the contracts celebrated between GRN and CIF (see Croese, 2012, p. 127 ; Resolução nº 61/06). Almost two years after GRN was created and the first steps for building '215,000 housing units in 24 cities of 18 provinces' were given, the only new city initiative that was effectively launched was the Cabinda project. Despite the seemingly oil-infused and well-resourced CIF, not much (if any) of the projected 31,436,706 square metres of built-up space had been developed. Many of the other projects in the CIF portfolio, including the elaboration of the Plan for the New City of Luanda, had run into a similar situation. The Council of Ministers' resolution was issued in September but most 'projects came to a standstill' (Campos & Vines, 2008, p. 10 ) not long after that. The majority of the contracts listed in it were either restructured or completely abandoned. In the case of the agreement to build 215,500 housing units throughout the country, there was both a significant reduction in its immediate objectives and an apparent diversification of its means. While GRN endured (only until 2010, when its housing development responsibilities were passed over to SONIP), some say that CIF turned out to be a 'fiasco' (Croese, 2012, p. 128) . Indeed, it might have been, but it was out of the calculus leading to it that the 'new centralities' project emerged.
Conclusion: The Real Circuitries of African Urban Fantasies
The intricate threads through which Cidade do Kilamba and the other 'new centralities' of Luanda were assembled, designed and effectively built over the years allows us to reconsider and fine-tune some of the propositions with which the study of Africa's emerging forms of urban development has been carried out thus far. Two aspects seem especially relevant. One has to do with the ideas of speculation and fantasy. The other is related to the role of aesthetics.
By conceptualising these new city plans as speculative fantasies, urban scholars and students of African cities have predicated much of their analysis on the idea that these constitute an 'ocular ground' of billboards, advertisements and 3D imagery 'in which the city seems to appear out of nothing and might well vanish again into nothing' (De Boeck, 2011, p. 279) . In doing so they typically argue that the chimerical qualities of such images (or the remote chances that most have of being implemented) do not take away from their significance. In Watson's perspective, for instance, 'there is no doubt that the scale and extent of change envisioned in these plans might be sufficient to mobilise shack dwellers, unemployed youth, local informal and formal businesses and the NGO sector at a citywide scale, to effectively counter these interventions' (Watson, 2014a, p. 230) . De Boeck goes at it from a more explicitly theoretical angle. Making sense of how the longing for a better city embodied in those images 'unites Kinshasa's powerful and powerless, its Big Men and its petit peuple ' (De Boeck, 2011, p. 278) , he holds Michel Foucault's reflections on 'other spaces' (Foucault, 1986) in the background when proposing that such longing 'offers a new heterotopia, a new space that escapes from the real order of things, its standard forms of classification and accumulation, if only because it conjures up the marvellous through its appeal to the imagination and the oneiric' (De Boeck, 2011, p. 278) . In the end, he continues, 'it is as if it almost doesn't seem to matter whether the new city is physically built or not', because 'the only place where the city can be inhabited and in which it is constantly being build [sic] , is in the place of language, in the architecture of words' (De Boeck, 2011, p. 279) .
Gautam Bhan, who offered a brief reflection on Watson's arguments by thinking through current fantasies in Indian cities, takes up some of these ideas. Also borrowing from Foucault, albeit more openly and from a different text, one of his claims on 'the real lives of urban fantasies' is that 'even if undone by their own terms, these plans are also ends unto themselves' (Bhan, 2014, p. 234) . In the conversation about Discipline and Punish and 'questions of method' from which he obtains his insight, Foucault points out that dreams, utopias and imaginary productions 'aren't abortive schemas for the creation of a reality' (Foucault, 1991, pp. 81-82) . Rather, 'they induce a whole series of effects in the real: they crystallise into institutions, they inform individual behaviour, they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things.' Bringing this understanding to the realm of urbanism and the discussion on the images and imaginations of urban fantasies, Bhan argues something very similar to De Boeck. 'The conjuring of these images and imaginations alongside their circulation,' he says (Bhan, 2014, p. 234) , 'shapes urban politics. It claims the space and form of aspirations and future just as it guides how one thinks about the present'.
These are all important arguments. But they overlook the significance of understanding the ways in which these fantasies are coming to be. In fact, they neglect that which was Foucault's first point about the importance of taking dreams, utopias and imaginary productions seriously-that 'the elaboration of these schemas corresponds to a whole series of diverse practices and strategies' (Foucault, 1991, p. 81) . This article has provided two brief illustrations of some of those practices and strategies in the case of Angola's 'new centralities'. Of course, these do not constitute a whole or unbroken form of city planning. But even if they evolved across widely dispersed arrangements-structures full of failures, disconnections and uncertain ideals-these practices and strategies have comprised a mode of city making that is deeply entwined in the specific circuitries of Angola's political economy.
In particular, they were put together and negotiated in the 'zone of political and economic calculation' (Watts, 2012, p. 442 ) demarcated by oil. This 'oil assemblage', as Watts has it, is a vast governable space constituted by 'the variety of actors, agents and processes that give shape to our contemporary iteration of hydrocarbon capitalism'-not just all that surrounds the operations of the oil industry but also actors, agents and processes across multiple other spheres. In the case of Cidade do Kilamba the oil assemblage extends well into financial transactions in Beijing, the practices of urban planning at GRN or the mechanism of renda resolúvel deployed by SONIP to rescue the project. Together with a variety of other specific regulations, arrangements and procedures, they constitute what Bhan would perhaps call the real circuitries of urban fantasies.
This takes us to a second theoretical adjustment in our current understanding of how new forms of urbanism have been emerging throughout Africa. The circuitries through which Cidade do Kilamba loomed imposingly beyond the southern periphery of Luanda were spurred by a number of both material and immaterial flows. Of the different elements circulating through their multi-scalar infrastructures, oil is obviously the most prominent. Just like in the Exim Bank of China credit line mentioned above, in one of the loans that financed the project, the one negotiated with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 2009, 30,000 barrels per day are theoretically still being shipped as repayment (Alves, 2011, p. 154) . Many analysts of Chinese interests in Angola would rightfully argue that workers, construction materials or modes of expertise have also been crucial components of those circuitries. Based on the illustrations presented above, I would propose that some of the most fundamental pulses running through them have been numbers, spreadsheets and all sorts of counting tallies.
This would certainly not come as a surprise to those who have studied the types of calculative practices propelled by the abundance of oil (see, for example, Mitchell, 2011) , but it is something that the current focus on aesthetic regimes in the literature on new city projects in Africa might preclude us from understanding. This is because, as we have just seen, analysts of urban fantasies have deemed the circulation and forging of urban futures in contemporary African cities as being primarily composed of images, words and metaphors. In De Boeck's analysis of 'spectral Kinshasa', for instance, both official and alternative urban orders are fundamentally built 'through an architecture of words' (De Boeck, 2012) . Complementary to this, as we have above, Watson (2014a, p. 217) performs her own analysis of these new city projects by looking at them as 'graphically represented and threedimensional visions of future cities' or, as she puts it in her recent and very brief comparison with the new urban utopias of contemporary India, as graphics showing 'a city with no poverty and unemployment, where global capital is welcome and can operate without constraint' (Watson, 2015, p. 37) . But the parallel with Indian cities and their identified idioms of 'world-city making' might cloud our perception of how these projects are being put together in Africa. While I certainly cannot assess what is going on across the continent, in Angola evidence suggests that there is a whole set of planning practices that do not really fall under what Asher Ghertner (2011, p. 281 ) has referred to as an 'aesthetic mode of governing'.
To be sure, this is not to say that aesthetic criteria have not played a fundamental role in the negotiations of Luanda's urban future. As Claudia Gastrow has shown, 'the realm of urban aesthetics is one of the key areas where citizenship is being constituted in contemporary Angola' (Gastrow, 2014, p. 22; Gastrow, 2016) . In the same way, the dreams, delusions and forms of representation identified by Watson or De Boeck are certainly also present all across the city, be it on billboards and advertisements or on flashy websites and videos, or even in the very visual space that Cidade do Kilamba came to occupy in the imaginary of progress in Angola. But I would like to suggest that there is something complementary to these aesthetic circulations that needs to be better understood, for I saw more numbers than images weaving through the circuitries of Luanda's new centralities, fewer dreamy metaphors than dull excel sheets. And this has important implications for urban politics. This is because, if the city is being built through an architecture of numbers (see De Boeck, 2012) , perhaps what we have is less 'rule by aesthetics' (Ghertner, 2011) and more rule by bookkeeping-a calculative regime that converts oil barrels crossing past the Indian Ocean into tallies of built area all across Angola.
Notes
1. The research out of which this article emerged was conducted on two main fronts. During three fieldwork trips to Luanda (two visits in 2009 and 2010 and a long-term stay between January 2012 and March 2013), I talked to and interviewed dozens of urban planners and public officials in a wide array of government bodies and undertook extensive participant observation in a number of planning venues across Luanda. In addition to this, I conducted research in the archives of Angolan newspapers, in the Official Journal of the Republic (Diário da República), and in private records that some of my informants shared with me. 2. Implicit in the amount of rent charged was a fixed interest rate of 3% see Decreto Executivo Conjunto nº 253/12. 3. On 13 October 2012, a 'distribution list' naming 550 people selected to buy a house in Kilamba was published in Jornal de Angola. These were the monthly payments listed for the available apartments. At the time, AKZ100 was equivalent to about $1. 4. To be sure, according to the data I had access to, much of what I am describing here probably predates any tangible actions towards the elaboration of any of these plans. Nonetheless, I would argue, the institutional and financing edifice that I briefly outline provides a crucial underpinning structure for what we see today in the periphery of Luanda.
